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The Present Scope of Recovery for
Unfair Competition Violations
Under Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Acti has generally been viewed as
a reaction against the restrictiveness of the common law action for
false advertising. 2 Although the section was enacted in 1946 as
part of the Federal Trademark Act,3 the purpose of the section was
not to protect registered trademarks but to prohibit unfair compe-
tition. 4 However, due to the failure of the legal profession to rec-
ognize the potential in this area, very few cases were brought
under the section in the early years of its enactment.
The initial cases that did interpret section 43(a) were quite re-
strictive and limited the section to the conservative common law
views.5 More recently, however, the broad language of the section
has been used to allow recovery in many situations, and section
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
2. Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act:
You've Come a Long Way, Baby-Too Far, Maybe?, 64 TRADEMARK REP. 193
(1974). See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. REv.
987 (1949). See also L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d
Cir. 1954).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1976).
4. The basic concept of unfair competition at common law meant protection of a
common law trademark, i.e., no one should be allowed to represent his goods
as those of another. Unfair competition today, however, is much broader,
and not only protects a plaintiff's goodwill in a product, but also prevents a
competitor from obtaining an undue advantage from another's efforts. In ad-
dition, unfair competition protects false advertising, specifically, any untrue
statement made by the defendant about the product. R. CALLSANN, THE LAW
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLS § 4.1 (3d ed. 1967).
5. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951); Samson
Crane v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), affd per
curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
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43(a) now covers most aspects of unfair competition. 6 This com-
ment will examine the present scope of section 43(a), which pro-
vides:
Any person who shall... use in connection with any goods or services
... a false designation of origin, or any false description or representa-
tion, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or rep-
resent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into
commerce... shall be liable to a civil action... by any person who be-
lieves that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false
description or representation.
7
IL THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 43(a)
A. Procedural Requirements
The basic grant of jurisdiction for any suit arising out of the
Lanham Act is section 39.8 The section provides that the courts
shall have jurisdiction over "all actions arising under this chapter,
without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack
of diversity of the citizenship of the parties."9 Although the nor-
mal federal jurisdictional requirements are not necessary to bring
suit under this section, section 43(a) requires that the goods or
services being misrepresented must have entered commerce.10
Section 45 of the Lanham Act defines commerce as "all commerce
which may be lawfully regulated by Congress."'"
Although the language of section 43 (a) quite broadly states that
an action may be commenced by "any person who believes that he
is or is likely to be damaged,"' 2 the majority of the courts have not
interpreted the section to give the consuming public standing de-
spite apparent compliance with the damage provision.' 3 The rea-
son for this restrictive interpretation is found in section 45 of the
6. R. CALxmANN, supra note 4, § 18.2, at 609. Several attempts have been made
in Congress to pass federal legislation which would establish a uniform body
of federal unfair competition law. The most recent bill was introduced by
Senator John J. McClellan on April 28, 1977. See PAT., T.M. & COPYP=GHT J.
(BNA) A12, D-1 (No. 327 May 5, 1977).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
8. Id. § 1121.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 1125(a).
11. Id. § 1127. In Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967), the court
held that interstate commerce is such an important element that failure to
allege and prove it will, by itself, constitute a proper basis for dismissal.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
13. See Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Florida ex rel. Boward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F.
Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Marshall v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp.
828 (D. Md. 1959). Contra, Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Org., Inc., 333 F. Supp.
116 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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Act which states its intent "is to protect persons engaged in such
commerce against unfair competition."' 4 Thus, as concluded in
Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd.,15 "[tlhe Act's pur-
pose as defined in section 45, is exclusively to protect the interests
of a purely commercial class against unscrupulous commercial
conduct."' 6 However, the issue of consumer standing under the
section does not appear to be conclusively settled, and more litiga-
tion is likely on this issue in the future.17
B. Substantive Requirements
The main requirement of a section 43(a) suit is that a false rep-
resentation be made by the defendant. 18 Specifically, the section
prohibits (1) any false designation of origin, or (2) any false
description or representation. 19 Common law trademark, also re-
ferred to as passing off, violations are concerned with confusion as
to source and thus depend on the false designation of origin lan-
guage as their basis for recovery, while false advertising claims de-
pend on the false description or representation language.
A cause of action under section 43(a) is stated by alleging that a
falsity did in fact occur; there is no requirement of an intent to
deceive.20 Although section 43(a) is embodied within the Federal
Trademark Act, the section itself is not concerned with registered
trademarks, 2' and it has been consistently held that a registered
trademark is not a prerequisite to maintaining an action under the
section. 2
While section 43 (a) does not specifically mention available rem-
edies, the courts-have interpreted section 43(a) to include both the
right to an injunction and monetary damages, since both are avail-
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
15. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
16. Id. at 692.
17. Many commentators advocate that consumers must be allowed standing to
sue under section 43(a) to adequately protect their interests. See, e.g.,
Germain, supra note 2, at 201-05; Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act Held
Not to Confer Upon Consumers Standing to Sue in Federal Courts, 72 CoLurm.
L REV. 182 (1972); Note, Consumer Law--Standing-School Children Denied
Standing to Sue for False Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 46 N.Y.U. L REv. 807 (1971).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). Recently, a few courts have indicated it is enough
if misleading, although not literally false, statements are made. See
generally notes 132-35 infra.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
20. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 1958).
21. See note 4 & accompanying text supra.
22. Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (ND. Ill. 1967); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129
F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955).
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able under other provisions of the Lanham Act.2 3 Injunctive relief
is provided for federally registered trademarks in section 34 of the
Act,24 but it is unclear whether the courts derive their power to
grant injunctions from that section or from their general equity
powers. They have held that a plaintiff, to obtain an injunction
under section 43(a), need only show that the falsities complained
of had a tendency to deceive.25 For monetary damages, section 35
of the Act 26 requires that the plaintiff show that the defendant's
representation was false and that a portion of the consuming pub-
lic was in fact deceived.27 Therefore, proof of actual consumer re-
liance is a necessity if damages are to be awarded under section
43(a) .28
I. ANALYSIS
The main purpose of this article is to analyze the types of cases
that have been decided under section 43(a), in order to ascertain
the present usefulness of the section as it concerns unfair competi-
tion. Notwithstanding the slow emergence of the section as a
means of remedying unfair competition,2 9 the statute has been ap-
plied in a variety of situations in recent years. While some com-
mentators assert that the section has been interpreted far too
broadly,30 others indicate that the statute has not been read
broadly enough, and before its potential will be reached, further
expansion is necessary.3 1
A. False Designation of Origin
The clause of section 43(a) which provides "[aIny person who
23. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1965); Park-
way Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958); Electron-
ics Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Mass. 1973);
Geisel v. Poynter Prod. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1976).
25. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1958).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976).
27. Hesmer Foods Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965).
28. Id.
29. Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1951); Samson
Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), a f'dper
curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
Judge Clark remarked of the yet untapped potential of section 43(a): "In-
deed, there is indication here and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized
the potential impact of this statutory provision." Maternally Yours, Inc. v.
Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, J., con-
curring).
30. See Germain, supra note 2, at 218-21.
31. Lunsford, Protection from False and Misleading Advertising, 35 FED. B.J. 87
(1976); Note, Section 43(a)of the Lanham Act" Its Development and Potential,
3 LoY. Cm. I.J. 327, 343 (1972). See also Glenn v. Advertising Publication
Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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shall.., use... a false designation of origin"32 is the basis for the
first broad category of cases decided under section 43(a)-those
involving common law trademarks and trademark-like violations,
normally called passing off violations. Passing off claims deal with
the attempt by a competitor to sell his or her goods as those of
another. They typically involve the defendant's use of plaintiffs
well-known product name, symbol, or familiar packaging to attract
the public to the product under the assumption that it is the plain-
tiffs product which is bought.33 Recovery was granted for this type
of unfair competition at common law since manufacturers were
generally considered to have a property right in the name of their
goods.34 However, since section 43(a) has been held to be applica-
ble to these claims, a great many plaintiffs have used this avenue
to seek their remedy, thus invoking the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, rather than relying upon their common law rights.35
It has been suggested that these passing off violations generally
fall into two categories.36 The first occurs when a manufacturer
substitutes goods for those of a competitor when the product of the
competitor had been requested. The second, and most familiar
type of passing off, occurs when the manufacturer imitates an-
other's trademark, tradename, product appearance or packaging,
leading the consumer to purchase the goods under the false im-
pression that they were the goods of the competitor.
A trademark is very valuable to a manufacturer once the con-
sumer associates it with a certain product. Accordingly, the Lan-
ham Act was primarily enacted to allow federal protection against
trademark infringement for those who registered their mark.
However, section 43(a) has consistently been held to grant federal
jurisdiction even for those cases involving marks which have not
been registered.37 There is some controversy as to whether the
section was intended to allow those with only common law trade-
marks to obtain federal jurisdiction. One commentator strongly
argues against the inclusion within section 43(a) of those cases
which, hQ maintains, have an adequate remedy at common law.38
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
33. Developments in the Lau-Competitive Torts, 77 HARv. L. REV. 888, 907 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]. For an analysis of the common law
background in this area, see Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at
the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue? 32
N.Y.U. I- REV. 1029, 1032 (1957).
34. See Derenberg, supra note 33, at 1032.
35. See notes 42-51 infra.
36. Developments, supra note 33, at 908-22.
37. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azofl, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963);
Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956).
38. Germain, supra note 2, at 219.
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He asserts that in this situation the plaintiff is merely obtaining a
free ride into the federal court system, when the state courts could
adequately handle the issue.3 9 However, notwithstanding such an
argument, the federal courts have consistently allowed such cases
to make use of section 43(a),40 and other commentators are in
agreement with the case law.41
1. Trademark Violations
Numerous cases have made use of section 43(a) as the vehicle
for remedying common law trademark violations. 42 The first case
directly raising the issue was Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty
Manufacturing Co.43 Plaintiff alleged that defendant was copying
portions of its copyrighted trade catalog and making use of various
of its registered and unregistered trademarks. Although denying
the preliminary injunction because of factual disputes, the court
held that plaintiff would have a cause of action concerning the un-
registered trademarks under section 43(a) if the marks had be-
come so associated with its goods that the use of the same or
similar mark by another constituted a representation that they
came from the original source.44
Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff,45 however, is the
case most noted for extending the section's false description of ori-
gin language. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that defendants
placed into commerce certain bearings, rods, and containers that
so closely imitated those of plaintiffs that the public was confused
39. 'Thus, designations of 'origin' under Section 43(a) have provided a backdoor
entry into federal courts for typical trademark and unfair competition cases."
Id.
40. See cases cited in note 42 infra.
41. See Lunsford, supra note 31, at 104-05.
42. Beech-Nut, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 480 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1973); Sutton
Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972); Heaton Dis-
trib. Co. v. Union Tank Car Co., 387 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1967); Federal-Mogul-
Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); Joshua Meier Co. v.
Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956); Menley & James Labs.
Ltd. v. Approved Pharm. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Phillip Mor-
ris Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 188 U.S.P.Q. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Na-
tional Lampoon, Inc. v. ABC, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Centsable
Prod., Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros., 179 U.S.P.Q. 645 (N.D. IM. 1973); McTavish Bob
Oil Co. v. Disco Oil Co., 345 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Mll. 1972); Mortellito v. Nina of
Cal., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
43. 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956).
44. Id. at 147. See also Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.,
173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (another of the early cases to hold that the
use of another's trademark violated section 43(a) even though it was a com-
mon law, not a registered mark).
45. 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963).
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as to the origin of the products. The court held that the origin lan-
guage of the section includes origin of manufacture as well as geo-
graphic origin,4 6 thus reaffirming the earlier cases which held that
the violation fell within the section:
[Section 43(a)] does provide a right of action to persons engaged in
interstate and foreign commerce, against deceptive and misleading use of
common law trademarks, and against deceptive and misleading use of
words, names, symbols, or devices, or any combination thereof, which
have been adopted by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods
and distinguish them from those manufactured by others ... 47
A vital requirement in those cases dealing with unregistered
trademarks is that secondary meaning must be proved by plaintiff
before section 43(a) is applicable.46 Unless plaintiff can prove sec-
ondary meaning, i.e., show that consumers primarily associate the
mark with plaintiff's article or business, section 43(a) cannot pro-
vide relief because the use of the mark would not falsely indicate
the origin of the product. 4 9
In Beech-Nut, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.,50 a case involving a
battle between two companies concerning their breath mints, the
Second Circuit held that any trademark infringement action which
asserted a likelihood of deception could, on the basis of section
43(a), be removed to federal court. The court noted: "Despite
considerable doubt created by the statute as to whether section
43(a)... covers mere trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion, the many cases decided since its enactment leave no doubt
that as construed by the courts, the claims advanced here may
properly be brought under this section."5' 1
2. Packaging and Trade Dress
Misleading packaging and trade dress is the second form of un-
fair competition found to violate the false designation of origin
46. There are not many cases under section 43(a) dealing with the false indica-
tion of geographic origin. But see Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 222 (D.N.J. 1960).
47. 313 F.2d at 409.
48. See generally note 42 supra. See also Germain, supra note 2, at 211.
49. Secondary meaning traditionally applies to a word which is originally de-
scriptive:
It contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense
primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an
article on the market, because... descriptive, might nevertheless
have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with ref-
erence to his article that ... the word or phrase had come to mean
that the article was his product.
G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912).
50. 480 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1973).
51. Id. at 803.
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clause of section 43(a). This violation is very similar to that of
trademark infringement, and both often occur together.5 2 This vi-
olation involves defendant's use of plaintiff's distinguishing pack-
age shape or design in the hope that the consumer will fail to
differentiate between the two products. Although packaging and
trade dress are, on occasion, appropriate for federal registration as
trademarks,53 more often than not section 43(a) has been relied
upon to obtain federal court jurisdiction.
One of the first cases to use section 43(a) in this manner was
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Royal-Pioneer Paper Box Manufacturing
Co.54 Kodak sought to enjoin defendant from manufacturing and
selling photographic film boxes of a design and color deceptively
similar to Kodak's. Although section 43(a) was not discussed in
great depth, the court held that since Kodak's boxes had acquired
secondary meaning, and the contents were of superior quality, de-
fendant had attempted to pass off its film as that of Kodak. De-
spite constituting unfair competition at common law, such actions
were also held to violate section 43(a).55
A more recent Kodak case56 involved defendant's use of yellow,
red and black colors on its outlets for film processing, in addition to
Kodak's trademark. The public became confused and was under
the impression that the developing outlet was run by Kodak. The
court held that for injunctive relief under section 43(a), as well as
under the rest of the Lanham Act, a showing of likelihood of confu-
sion is sufficient to establish that defendant appropriated the de-
sign and overall appearance of plaintiffs trade dress.5 7
Although there are several quite recent cases in this area that
make use of section 43(a), 58 one is particularly important. In Men-
ley & James Laboratories Ltd. v. Approved Pharmaceutical
Corp.,5 9 the plaintiff was the manufacturer of the allergy medicine,
A.R.M. The defendant entered the market producing a medicine
which it called ARCOMP. The medicine produced by the new-
comer was virtually identical in size, shape, and color to that of
plaintiff. In addition, the boxes used were similar in size, shape,
52. Beech-Nut, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 480 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1973); Menley &
James Labs. Ltd. v. Approved Pharm. Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.N.Y. 1977);
Clairol, Inc. v. Cosway Co., Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 583 (C.D. CaL 1974).
53. See Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
54. 197 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
55. Id. at 135.
56. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
57. Id. at 309.
58. Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. Custom Cloud Motors, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 80
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Clairol, Inc. v. Cosway Co., Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 583 (C.D. Cal.
1974); Bogene Inc. v. Whit-Mor Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
59. 438 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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and print size. Although plaintiff sued both to protect its federally
registered trademark and the copyrighted printed matter on the
box, section 43(a) was invoked to remedy the unfair method of
competition used by the defendant which was evidenced by the
similarity in all respects of both the medicine and its container.
The court granted the preliminary injunction: "The facts of this
case lead inescapably to the conclusion that the defendant...
designed his products and marketing devices and techniques with
the intention of 'cashing in' on plaintiffs reputation, advertising,
and established position in the allergy medicine market, a result
which cannot be tolerated. '60
3. Service Marks and Certification Marks
The cases arising under section 43(a) for the infringement of a
service mark differ very little from those dealing with the infringe-
ment of a trademark.6' A service mark describes and identifies a
service, such as a restaurant or hotel, rather than a particular prod-
uct. The cases have held that the use of another's common law
service mark falls squarely within the false indication of origin
clause of the section, if plaintiff establishes secondary meaning.62
One case has been reported dealing with the misuse of a certifi-
cation mark under section 43(a). In State ofFlorida v. Real Juices,
Inc.,63 the court applied the term certification mark as defined in
section 45 of the Lanham Act.64 The State Department of Citrus
desired to enjoin defendant's use of the name "Sunshine Tree,"
since it already had an unregistered certification mark on those
words in its promotion of Florida citrus. The court granted the
preliminary injunction, holding that section 43(a) would be ex-
tended to cover cases involving unregistered certification marks
where the words had become distinctly associated with the plain-
60. Id. at 1066. The case obviously involved more than one violation, and ap-
pears similar in many respects to the appropriation of an entire business
method, discussed infra at notes 116-21.
61. Rare Earth, Inc. v. Hoorelbeke, 401 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Steak & Brew,
Inc. v. Beef & Brew Restaurant, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D. IlL 1974); Boston
Prof. Hockey Ass'n Inc. v. Reliable Knitting Works, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. 274 (E.D.
Wis. 1973); Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Burger King of
Fla., Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
62. See cases cited in note 61 supra.
63. 330 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
64. [A] mark used upon or in connection with the products or services of
one or more persons ... to certify regional or other origin, material,
mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy or other characteristics of
such goods or services or that the work or labor on the goods or serv-
ices was performed by members of a union or other organization.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
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tiff and the likelihood of confusion could arise.65
4. False Authorization or Approval
The fact situations involving false authorization or approval are
similar to many of those discussed previously, with one exception.
Instead of attempting to completely pass off its product as that of
plaintiff by using only plaintiff's distinguishing name or mark, de-
fendant uses both its own name and that of plaintiff in identifying
the source in an attempt to imply that the two parties were work-
ing in conjunction on the product, or that it was produced by de-
fendant with the authorization or approval of plaintiff. The initial
case involving this fact pattern was Parkway Baking Co. v. Frei-
hofer Baking Co.66 In Parkway, plaintiff was the exclusive li-
censee of a bread company selling diet bread. Defendant, a past
licensee in the same area, continued to sell bread using a label in-
dicating it was the current licensee, and thus that its selling was
done with the approval of the licensor. The court held that anyone
who sold merchandise under the false representation that it was
under sponsorship and with approval of the licensor fell within the
scope of section 43(a).67 However, since defendant had ceased the
action complained of in Parkway, there was no need for the court
to issue an injunction.
The purpose of engaging in this type of activity is to not only
confuse the consumer as to the actual source of the product, but in
so doing, to cause deception as to the quality of the product. This
was illustrated in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.,68 in which the
defendant copied dolls from the famous Dr. Seuss cartoons, and
was using the Dr. Seuss name in conjunction with the sale of the
dolls, all without plaintiff's permission. Since the tags, boxes, ad-
vertising literature, and all oral and written sales representations
conveyed the clear impression that the dolls were manufactured
with the approval of plaintiff, the court held that section 43(a) was
the proper basis for relief.69
In the past several years, other cases have been decided in
which recovery was at least partially based on the false authoriza-
tion or approval theory.70 In Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fi-
65. 330 F. Supp. at 431.
66. 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958).
67. Id. at 643.
68. 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
69. 'The defendants do not possess the right to represent that their goods were
sponsored or authorized by the plaintiff; nor do they have the right to repre-
sent as copies, goods which are poorly made and deviate materially from the
originals." Id. at 268.
70. Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Rolls-Royce
Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689 (N.D. Ga. 1977); John
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berglass, Inc.,7 1 defendant sold a kit which converted the ordinary
grill and hood ornament of a Volkswagon Bug into one resembling
that of a Rolls-Royce. Although the court determined that there
was no real confusion in the mind of the consumer who saw the
converted cars as to whether they were in fact Volkswagons or
Rolls-Royces, harm existed because it was possible for the con-
sumer to believe that the kits were sold, sponsored, or endorsed by
the Rolls-Royce Company:
The court need not invariably find confusion or deception on the part of
the potential purchasers but may look as well to public identifications of
the symbols. It is evident.., that its kits were selling, and were designed
to sell primarily, if not exclusively, because of the public recognition of
Rolls-Royce.
7 2
5. The Moral Rights Cases
There have been two cases7 3 which have applied section 43(a)
to redress rights of artists, actors, or writers whose artistic works
had been distorted in some fashion by defendants. Gilliam v.
ABC, Inc.74 concerned a group of British writers and performers,
who went by the name of Monty Python. The group was associ-
ated with a distinctive style of comedy and its material was origi-
nally written for BBC Television. ABC ultimately bought some
rights to several of the Monty Python programs and edited them in
such a fashion that the works were allegedly mutilated. Monty
Python brought suit for an injunction on the basis that it did not
want its name connected with the edited film. The court allowed
the injunction, denying ABC the right to broadcast the show in the
edited form.
Although its decision was based partially on contract princi-
ples, the court also discussed section 43(a) and its relation to such
an action. It noted that redressing the mutilation of an artist's
work 'Tmds its roots in the continental concept of droit moral, or
Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Rolls-Royce Mo-
tors Ltd. v. Custom Cloud Motors, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
SmokEnders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 309 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
71. 428 F. Supp. 689 (NJD. Ga. 1977).
72. Id. at 695 (footnotes and citations omitted). See also Rolls-Royce Motors
Ltd. v. Custom Cloud Motors, Inc., 190 U.S.P.Q. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the prior
Rolls-Royce case); Annual Review Comm, The Thirtieth Year of Administra-
tion of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 67 TRADEmAR REP. 471, 571-74
(1977).
73. Gilliam v. ABC, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pic-
tures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See Case Comment, Monty Python and the Lan-
ham Act In Search of the Moral Right, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 452 (1977); Com-
ment, Moral Rightsfor Artists Under the Lanham Act, 18 WI. & MARY L REv.
595 (1977).
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moral right, which may generally be summarized as including the
right of the artist to have his work attributed to him in the form in
which he created it. ' '75 The court reasoned that section 43(a) had
been used to prevent misrepresentation that could injure one's
business or reputation, and that the film edited by ABC, yet still
carrying the attribution to Monty Python, tended to create a false
impression as to its origin.7 6 Therefore, plaintiffs in such a case
desired "to redress the very rights sought to be protected by
43(a)."77 Since moral rights have not been explicitly recognized in
the United States, it is quite possible that, as a consequence of this
recent case, a new surge of suits of this type could result, basing
claims for recovery on section 43(a).7 8
6. Product Copying
The otherwise unprotected field of product copying has recently
found section 43(a) to be a basis for protection. While a thorough
discussion of this area is beyond the scope of this article, a brief
summary of the law of product copying as it relates to section 43 (a)
is necessary. Prior to the landmark decisions by the Supreme
Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 79 and Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,80 it was held in Catalina, Inc. v. Gem
Swimwear, Inc.81 that under section 43(a) plaintiff had stated a
cause of action against defendant, under a passing off theory, for
the slavish copying and production of its product, a type of swim-
suit.
The Sears and Compco decisions, while dealing with state law,
held that any laws attempting to restrict product copying were pre-
empted by the federal laws of patent and copyright. Therefore, if a
product was not protectable under one of those two statutes, the
product could be freely copied and produced in its entirety by any-
one, and neither a functional nor non-functional feature of the
product was entitled to protection.8 2 Although some commenta-
tors seem to agree that the Sears and Compco decisions have pre-
empted even the power of section 43(a) to protect a manufacturer
against the copying of its product design,8 3 a recent case appears to
75. 538 F.2d at 24.
76. Id. at 24-25.
77. Id.
78. However, Judge Gurfein indicated in his concurrence in Gilliam that al-
though the plaintiffs should be entitled to recovery on some basis, section
43(a), in his opinion, was not the correct basis. Id. at 27.
79. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
80. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
81. 162 F. Supp. 911, 912 (SD.N.Y. 1958).
82. 376 U.S. at 232-33.
83. Germain, supra note 2, at 210; Obdyke, The Lanham Trademark Act Section
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allow protection.84
In Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,85 the court
did not concern itself a great deal with the Sears and Compco deci-
sions, but did grant plaintiff protection for its unique trailer design.
The plaintiff, TESCO, was a Lincoln, Nebraska, firm which was the
original manufacturer of a semi-trailer featuring a particular de-
sign and structure. The defendant, Fruehauf, used photographs of
plaintiff's trailer in its sales literature to promote its entry into the
hopper-grain-trailer market and, in addition, copied the exterior
design of plaintiffs trailer. One of the theories set forth by plain-
tiff for recovery was that of unfair competition under section 43(a)
on the basis that defendant was falsely indicating to consumers
the origin of the product through an identical design. Although
defendant argued on the basis of Sears and Compco that it had a
legitimate right to copy the trailer design,86 the court found that
the cases were not applicable to that situation for the reason that
section 43(a) was a federal statute, and therefore, the preemption
theories of Sears and Compco could not be controlling since they
dealt only with protection of product design under state law.87 The
court also held that since plaintiff had established that the parts of
the trailer copied were unique, non-functional, and had secondary
meaning, defendant could be enjoined from copying those portions
of the trailer.8 8
The basis of the decision in Fruehauf appears to be, first, that
since the action was brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, a federal statute, Sears and Compco were not applicable.
Secondly, the court appears to indicate that the language in those
cases dealing with secondary meaning and the non-functional as-
pects of a product was dicta, and the cases, therefore, were not de-
terminative on those issues.8 9 The court further analyzed cases
dealing with copying of non-functional product features and con-
cluded that where a certain portion of a product, not necessary to
the purpose of the total product, had become so associated with
the product as to identify its source, the manufacturer, through the
use of section 43(a)'s "false indication of origin" language, should
have the right to stop another from appropriating the feature. In
the words of the court:
43(a): A Hidden National Law of Unfair Competition, 14 WASHBURN LJ. 330
(1975).
84. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976).
85. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
86. Id. at 1214.
87. Id. at 1215.
88. Id. at 1214.
89. Id. at 1215.
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Full and fair competition requires that those who invest time, money
and energy into the development of good will and a favorable reputation
be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment .... To protect
TESCO against the misappropriation of the exterior design of the Corn-
husker 800, portions of which are non-functional and which are possessed
of a secondary meaning, will be in furtherance of this congressional pur-
pose.... Contrary to the situation in Sears and Compco, there is in the
instant controversy no conflict with federal statutory policy. Fruehauf's
contention that it is privileged to copy the exterior design of the Corn-
husker 800 must fail.9°
The ultimate effect of the Fruehauf decision on the ability of
section 43(a) to deal with the product copying problem is uncer-
tain at best;91 however, it is quite likely that once decisions like
Fruehauf begin to allow some protection in this area, litigation
over the issue will increase.92
B. False Advertising
The false advertising cases arising under section 43(a) find
their basis for recovery in the prohibition of "any false description
or representation including words or other symbols tending falsely
to describe or represent the same. ' 93 False advertising in its sim-
plest form consists of untrue representations concerning one's
own goods.94 False advertising is typically found in cases in which
defendant falsely describes its product in such a way as to induce
the consumer to buy it because of attributes which in fact are not
present. At common law, competitors were seldom able to state a
cause of action for false representation, 95 and thus the emergence
of section 43(a) literally opened up to litigation the entire area of
false advertising. The need for recovery for false representation
has been thus stated by one commentator:
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. For a detailed examination of the Fruehauf decision, see Comment, Product
Simulation in the Eighth Circuit, 57 NEB. L REV. 91, 133-46 (1978).
92. In Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
affd, 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972), a court faced with a product copying issue
under section 43(a) basically avoided the issue, and held that since defend-
ant put its name on the product being copied (loudspeakers), plaintiff had
failed to establish on the motion for preliminary injunction that it would suc-
ceed. In Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J.
1976), the court did not mention section 43(a) but did cite to Fruehauf. In the
case defendant was enjoined from copying plaintiff's unique, nonfunctional
design of a parking meter, because the court found that the parking meter
qualified for common law trademark status, and thus Sears and Compco
were not applicable.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976).
94. See Developments, supra note 33, at 905.
95. Id. at 905-08. See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927); American Washboard Co. v.
Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900).
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Yet, in fact, false advertising injures every competitor. Everyone who
tries to increase profits of his business enterprise by methods not in ac-
cordance with the conduct of an honest businessman introduces into the
competitive arena factors capable of falsifying the basis of comparison.
As in a game, the winner should not be the competitor who wangled an
advantage by means which had no connection with his ability to partici-
pate in the contest.9 6
The modern day false advertising claim can be categorized into
two subheadings. The first involves defendant's use of a product
which has been the result of plaintiffs work and effort as a means
of advertising defendant's own product. The second involves de-
fendant claiming attributes for its product which the product does
not possess.
1. Use of Plaintiffs Work and Effort
a. Photographs
The first example of this type of false advertising involves pro-
motion of defendant's product through use of a photograph of
plaintiff's product. Usually defendant's product is of inferior qual-
ity. The first case to hold that section 43(a) did not encompass the
strict common law requirements for recovery for false advertising
was one involving the use of a photograph. In L'Aiglon Apparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,97 defendant had made use of a picture of
plaintiff's $17.95 dress to advertise defendant's inferior $6.95 dress.
Plaintiff claimed that such a misrepresentation on the part of de-
fendant had caused it to lose customers to defendant, and that
other trade was lost because of the impression that plaintiff was
offering the cheaper dress for $17.95. The court held that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action under section 43(a). 98 Judge Hastie,
for the court, stated: "In relation to the language of Section 43(a)
this complaint states about as plain a use of false representation of
goods sold in commerce as could be imagined."99
The majority of the cases dealing with the false impression cre-
ated by the defendant's use of a photograph have followed very
closely the rationale set forth in L'Aiglon and have held that a
cause of action does exist for such use under section 43(a).100
96. Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 CoLms. L. REV. 876, 876
(1948).
97. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
98. Id. at 651.
99. Id. at 650.
100. Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976); Matshushita Elec. Corp. of America v. Solar Sound Sys.,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Centsable Prod., Inc. v. Goldblatt Bros.,
179 U.S.P.Q. 645 (N.D. M- 1973); Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 266 F.
Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); American Optical Co. v. Rayex Corp., 266 F. Supp.
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cert denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-
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However, there are two minority views that have emerged in the
area of photographs. The first is represented by George O'Day As-
sociates, Inc. v. Talman Corp.'0l The court found that the use by
a former employee of a photograph of a sailboat manufacturer's
somewhat modified sailboat did not violate section 43(a) since it
was not an exact reproduction and it was not demonstrated that
the boat offered for sale was of lesser quality than the one shown
in the advertisement. 0 2 In contrast to O'Day, most of the other
cases concerned a product that was inferior to the item photo-
graphed. However, it appears that, despite the O'Day holding, the
better view is that the inferiority of the product is not a necessary
element for recovery under section 43(a). The reason is that it is,
in effect, a false representation to use the picture of someone else's
product, whether superior or not, since in many circumstances it is
very difficult to judge inferior or superior quality.
The second line of cases which varies from the L'Aiglon hold-
ing began with General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp. 0 3 In
General Pool, defendants used a picture of plaintiff's swimming
pool to advertise their own. The court determined that plaintiff
would be entitled to relief under section 43(a) only on proof that
the picture had become so associated with plaintiff as to cause a
likelihood of confusion.10 4 While the other photograph cases have
relied upon the "false description or representation" portion of
section 43(a) as the basis for recovery, the court in General Pool
determined that section 43(a) was meant to embrace only those
kinds of unfair competition which were analogous to or associated
with the misuse of trademark or tradenames. 105 The court took a
very restrictive view of section 43(a), concluding that the only time
the use of a competitor's photograph could be actionable was if the
competition had established secondary meaning. 0 6
There appears to be only one other case following General
Pool's requirement of confusion as to source as a prerequisite to
recovery for false representation. In L & L White Metal Casting
Corp. v. Joseph,'0 7 defendant used a photograph of plaintiff's prod-
Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); National Dynamics Corp. v. John
Surrey, Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
101. 206 F. Supp. 297 (D.RI. 1962).
102. Id. at 300.
103. 259 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Il. 1966).
104. Id. at 386.
105. Id. at 385.
106. This court was the first to apply this approach to a photograph case, but it
followed the rationale of Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313
F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F.
Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949), ajOd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (lst Cir. 1950).
107. 387 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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uct in his own catalog to represent a different item. The court held
that since plaintiff had no proof that the photographs in its catalog
had acquired secondary meaning, there was no false designation of
origin under the section. However, the majority view requires no
confusion as to source, but allows recovery for false representation
under section 43(a) whenever defendant uses another's photo-
graph to advertise its product.
b. Catologs or Brochures
The second type of false advertising involving the use of a com-
petitor's creative work and effort is that of the misappropriation
and use of plaintiff's catalog or brochure. Although many of the
photograph cases also arose from a picture being used in defend-
ant's catalog or brochure, additional facts are necessary to place a
case in this category. In these cases plaintiff has generally de-
voted much time and effort to putting together an advertising
brochure, and defendant has attempted to use that work for adver-
tising its similar line of products. In Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v.
Folding Shutter Corp.,0 8 plaintiff manufactured shutters of origi-
nal design and circulated advertising material and drawings with
specifications relating to the shutters. The advertising material
was widely circulated. The defendant copied both the shutters
and the advertising brochures. In holding that plaintiff had stated
a cause of action under section 43(a), the court stated that the ac-
tion by defendant was the type of activity sought to be remedied
by the section. 0 9
The other cases dealing with this subject matter also allowed
recovery for plaintiff." 0 In Pantone, Inc. v. A. I Friedman, Inc.,"'
plaintiff was the originator of a color matching system embodied
within a copyrighted booklet. Defendant copied the booklet as
well as a cross-reference sheet for use with the booklet, leading the
ordinary observer to believe defendant's colors and color systems
were the same as plaintiff's when, in fact, defendant's booklet dif-
fered in shade, tint and quality. The court held that, in addition to
violating the copyright laws, defendant's distribution of the leaflet
and cross-reference sheet violated the false description and mis-
representation portion of section 43(a), since defendant's booklet
was not of the quality of plaintiff's, and could seriously harm con-
sumers who might attempt to use the two systems together." 2
108. 441 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1971).
109. Id. at 557.
110. N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Pantone,
Inc. v. AJL Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
111. 294 F. Supp. 545 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
112. Id. at 552.
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c. Samples
The use of plaintiff's goods as a sample of defendant's different,
and usually inferior, product is an example of a very extreme form
of false advertising. Quite understandably, since the courts have
granted relief under section 43(a) for improper use of a photo-
graph, recovery is even more likely in a case in which defendant
makes use of the product itself. In Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Im-
ports, Inc.," 3 defendant copied plaintiff's novelty light item, and
began to produce the product abroad, but took orders for the nov-
elty by displaying plaintiff's higher quality product. The court
held that defendant's use of the model had the same effect sought
to be prevented in the photograph cases. First, the action created
the impression that defendant's less expensive model was the
same as plaintiff's. The action also caused trade to be diverted
from plaintiff to defendant, and other trade was thus lost by plain-
tiff.'1 4 In a later case,1 5 plaintiff was held to have stated a cause of
action where defendant included in a display of products one of
plaintiff's products, which defendant did not produce.
The reasoning behind such recoveries should be obvious. De-
fendant, while not attempting to use plaintiff's name to promote its
product, is instead indicating by use of the sample that its product
will be of the same quality. By the substitution of a different and
lesser quality item, consumer is injured, as is plaintiff who may
ultimately lose business when its product becomes associated with
that of defendant, and consumers begin to buy from defendant
rather than plaintiff because of the false representation.
d. Entire Business Method
A few cases have been decided in which it is apparent that de-
fendant copied not only one particular item, but the competitor's
entire business method. Where such action can be shown by
plaintiff, section 43(a) is a very suitable means for recovery.
Although there are many cases which involve more than a sin-
gle violation, there are several cases which best exemplify this
method of false advertising.11 6 In SmokEnders, Inc. v. Smoke No
113. 266 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
114. Id. at 340.
115. John 0. Butler Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 365 F. Supp. 501 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See
also Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Indus., Inc., 19 A.D.2d 600, 240 N.Y.S.2d
624 (1963). For a slight variation from these cases, see Pic Design Corp. v.
Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (dictum) (section
43(a) would be violated if defendant purchased plaintiff's product, removed
all markings and sold it as its own).
116. John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 419 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
SmokEnders, Inc. v. Smoke No More, Inc., 184 U.S.P.Q. 309 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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More, Inc.,n 7 former employees of plaintiff set up a very similar
program for those who desired to stop smoking. Not only were
defendants found to have breached confidential agreements, ap-
propriated trade secrets, and infringed copyrights, they were held
to have violated section 43(a) by copying plaintiffs program, bas-
ing their ads on results of plaintiff's tests, and copying handouts
and ads. The court held that defendants had copied the services
to such an extent that it would be appropriate to grant an injunc-
tion against them under section 43(a). "These acts ... of the indi-
vidual defendants constitute false designations and
representations which are likely to cause confusion and to deceive
persons .... ",18 In this case, recovery for plaintiff did not de-
pend on any proof that the copied portions of its business had
achieved secondary meaning. Although some consumers might
have mistaken the origin of defendant's product, defendant's copy-
ing of another's idea and work was enough to violate the false
description and representation portion of the section.
In a more recent case, John Wright, Inc. v. Casper Corp.," 9 the
court found several violations of section 43(a). Plaintiff had been
selling carefully crafted replicas of antique banks since 1957.
These were sold with a certificate of authenticity. Defendant be-
gan selling inferior banks made abroad and accompanied with a
false certificate. The use of the confusingly similar certificates
was held to be unfair competition under section 43(a), as were the
many false representations about the product itself, i.e., the claims
that the banks were exact replicas, and the implications that they
were American made. 120
Since the defendant not only copied the plaintiffs product, but
also misrepresented almost every aspect of plaintiff's business in
some way, the obvious plan of defendant in this case was not only
to falsely represent the product as something it was not, but fur-
ther to confuse consumers as to which bank they were actually
purchasing. The analysis of the court indicated that such trade
practices could not be tolerated under section 43(a).121
2. Claims Concerning the Attributes of Defendant's Product
a. False Representation of Product
In the following three subcategories concerning false advertis-
117. 184 U.S.P.Q. 309 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
118. Id. at 316.
119. 419 F. Supp. 292 (ED. Pa. 1976). See Annual Review Comm., supra note 72, at
568-71 (discussion of John Wright).
120. 419 F. Supp. at 326-27.
121. Id. at 325-27.
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ing, defendant has not misappropriated any work or effort of plain-
tiff, such as its photograph or sample, but in effect has
misrepresented the quality of its own product. This type of false
advertising seldom misrepresents the origin of the product, but is
actionable solely under the provision of section 43 (a) dealing with
false description or representation. One of the primary reasons a
federal remedy was necessary in this area, and so welcomed by the
courts, was that the common law denied recovery in this circum-
stance.122
The court in Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks,123 although denying recov-
ery because of insufficient evidence, discussed this type of false
representation under section 43(a). The defendant had been sug-
gesting that its floor product contained wax when, in fact, it did
not. The court interpreted section 43(a) to mean that one cannot
conduct business in a manner that unfairly interferes with, or in-
jures another by destroying a basis of genuine competition, or by
preventing the consumer from judging fairly between them.12 4
The court reiterated the view initially adopted in LAiglon Apparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell Inc. 125 that none of the common law require-
ments, such as the requirement that plaintiff be the only seller of a
product with the claimed characteristics, was adopted as part of
section 43(a).
The cases falling under this heading are numerous, and gener-
ally follow the reasoning that a false representation about a prod-
uct falls squarely within section 43(a).126 Of particular interest in
this area are a few of the more recent decisions. In Universal Ath-
letic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip-
ment Corp.,12 7 defendant, among other misleading specifications
and representations, falsely represented that its gym equipment
was of much higher quality, and had many more desirable attrib-
122. In American Washboard v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), plain-
tiff a manufacturer of aluminum washboards, sought to enjoin defendant
from representing that a competing zinc board was made of aluminum. No
cause of action was stated since no injuries to plaintiffs property right could
be proved.
123. 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C. 1955).
124. Id. at 940.
125. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954).
126. Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); American
Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker Davis
Publications, 372 F. Supp. 1 (ED. Pa. 1974); Natcontainer Corp. v. Continental
Can Co., 362 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Chanel, Inc. v. Smith, 178 U.S.P.Q.
630 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Potato Chip Inst. v. General Mills, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 173
(D. Neb. 1971); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 120
U.S.P.Q. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
127. 397 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
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utes, than was in fact true. The court, through a broad reading of
section 43(a), held that the "Lanham Act applies to the misrepre-
sentations of one's own goods, even where the misrepresentations
do not tend to confuse one's goods with those of a competitor, or
otherwise misstate the origin of the goods or to pass the goods off
under another's trademark."' 28
In American Brands, Inc. v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,129 a
conflict arose between two major tobacco companies concerning
advertisements of two brands of cigarettes. Plaintiff claimed sec-
tion 43(a) was violated when defendant tended to create the im-
pression that its NOW cigarettes contained the least tar, when in
fact plaintiff's CARLTON cigarettes had less. The court discussed
section 43(a) in depth and found defendant's initial advertisement
was in fact false, and thus could be enjoined under section 43(a).130
The court rejected defendant's assertion that section 43(a) applied
only to the misuse of trademark-type violations, but instead held
that on its face, section 43(a) applied to the strict false advertising
situation.13'
b. Misleading Representations
Misleading representations differ from false representations in
that defendant, while not directly saying something about its prod-
uct which in fact is not true, sets forth its statement in such a mis-
leading manner that the consumer may be wrongly influenced.
Thus, ultimately, the competitor may suffer harm. At least three
cases have dealt specifically with this problem. 132
In Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 33 a record producer de-
picted on an album cover the name and picture of singer Jimi Hen-
drix in a manner that created the impression he was the principal
performer when he was merely the accompanist. The court, hold-
ing for Hendrix and the record company with which he was then
associated, found that section 43(a) covered that form of misde-
scription:
Examination of legislative history reveals that this provision was intended
to prevent not only false designations as to origin, but to protect consum-
ers and competitors against all forms of misdescription or misrepresenta-
tion of products and services in commerce....
... Moreover, the statutory language is not limited to descriptions and
128. Id. at 1072.
129. 413 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
130. Id. at 1358-59.
131. Id. at 1355-56.
132. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973);
CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
133. 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.DN.Y. 1968).
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representations which are literally false. If that were so, the clause "in-
cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent"
would be superfluous.
1 3 4
A second record album case reached a very similar result.135
There the manufacturer published songs by singer Charlie Rich
which had been produced ten to fifteen years prior to that time,
and placed a recent picture of Rich on the front and back of the
album. The public was thereby misled into believing that the al-
bum contained current hits. Plaintiff was held to have stated a
claim based on section 43(a).
c. Misrepresentations in Comparative Advertising
There is little doubt that truthful comparative advertising is al-
lowed in any form,136 the most obvious types being those that ex-
plicitly name the competitor and suggest that the consumer
compare the two products. However, problems develop when the
advertising comparing the two products misleads the consumer. 3 7
Courts have made clear in comparative advertising cases, and
other disparagement cases, that disparagement of a competitor's
product alone will not provide the basis for a cause of action under
section 43(a).138 Disparagement is the untruthful tearing down of
a competitor's product, as distinguished from false advertising, in
which defendant builds up its own product. The reasoning for ex-
cluding disparagement from coverage under section 43(a) is that
the section covers only false or deceitful representations which de-
fendant makes about its own goods.139 Bernard Food Industries,
Inc. v. Dietene Co.,14o is the leading case holding that it is not suffi-
cient to establish disparagement of plaintiff's product; defendant
must make claims about its own product as well.14'
In Skil Corp. v. Rockwell International Corp.,142 plaintiff alleged
134. Id. at 586 (emphasis in original).
135. CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
court held a cause of action was stated under section 43(a) if the consuming
public believed it was purchasing a product substantially different from that
it thought it was purchasing. Id. at 567.
136. Nye, In Defense of Truthful Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP.
353, 353 (1977).
137. See generally 67 TRADEmARK REP. 351-418 (1977) (series of articles on compar-
ative advertising).
138. E.g., Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). See Sterk, The Law of Comparative Adver-
tising: How Much Worse Is "Better" Than "Great"?, 67 TRADEMAmK REP. 368,
380-85 (1977).
139. 415 F.2d at 1283.
140. 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970).
141. Id. at 1283.
142. 375 F. Supp. 777 (ND. Ill. 1974).
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defendant had, in its advertisements comparing portable electric
tools, made false and misleading statements concerning all of the
products compared. A cause of action was found to be stated
under section 43(a), since defendant, in addition to falsely repre-
senting the plaintiff's product, falsely built up its own as well.14 3
Since the decision in Skil, several more section 43(a) cases
have been decided dealing with comparative advertising.144 In
Saxony Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 145 the court affirmed the
right to make honest comparisons between the two products, even
to the extent of using the competitor's trademark, but held that
once defendant represented that its product was identical to the
other, and this was found to be false, such a misrepresentation
could violate section 43(a).
A very recent case, American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson &
Johnson,4 6 involved the assertion by plaintiff that its product,
Anacin, worked faster and relieved inflammation better than Tyle-
nol. After complaints about the ad from defendant, plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that its ads were not actionable,
and defendant counterclaimed. The case involved more than just
disparagement, because in addition to attacking the quality of de-
fendant's product, plaintiff also falsely represented that its product
could relieve pain faster, when in fact it could not. The court gave
a detailed discussion of consumer reaction to the advertisement,
since it found the reaction critical to the determination of whether
the advertisement was in fact misleading. In the end, defendant
was granted a permanent injunction. 147 The case is interesting be-
cause it demonstrates the detailed type of analysis that must be
made in some comparative advertising cases before a determina-
tion can be made as to whether or not there was a violation of sec-
tion 43(a).
143. Id. at 782. The court set forth five requirements for stating a claim under
section 43(a): (1) In its comparison advertisements, defendant made false
statements of fact about its own product. (2) The advertisements deceived
or had the tendency to deceive a substantial segment of their audience. (3)
Such deception was material, in that it was likely to influence the purchasing
decision. (4) The defendant caused its falsely advertised goods to enter com-
merce. (5) The plaintiff had been or was likely to be injured by direct diver-
sion of sales or the lessening of goodwill. Id. at 783.
144. Saxony Prods., Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975); American
Home Prods. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 436 F. Supp. 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
American Consumers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 416 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Tenn. 1976);
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip.
Corp., 397 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
145. 513 F.2d 716, 722 (9th Cir. 1975).
146. 436 F. Supp. 785 (SD.N.Y. 1977).
147. Id. at 803.
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In another case 148 dealing with the issue of comparative adver-
tising, the court denied recovery for false price advertising under
section 43(a). The operator of a supermarket sought to enjoin de-
fendant from engaging in false price advertising of its goods. Al-
though the court agreed with the theory that a false representation
of prices was just as bad as any other false representation concern-
ing a good's inherent ingredients or qualities, it refused recovery' 49
on the basis that it was restrained to follow the precedent within
its circuit. °5 0 The Sixth Circuit had held that section 43(a) re-
ferred not to any competitive practice, but only to competition as-
sociated with the misuse of trademarks or passing off. Although
the court in this case felt restrained to follow the view adopted by
the Sixth Circuit, this article has demonstrated that the majority of
cases hold otherwise,15 ' indicating this court's view is clearly out-
moded.
d. Activities Held Not to Violate Section 43(a)
Brief mention should be made of those activities which have
been held not to violate section 43(a). As stated previously, 5 2 dis-
paragement alone does not violate section 43(a). The rationale is
that section 43(a) requires a representation to be made about the
product, a requirement that has been interpreted to include only
defendant's goods, not those of plaintiff.' 53
It has been argued in several cases'5 that statements about
plaintiff's product, even though wholly truthful, should be actiona-
ble under section 43(a), for the reason that plaintiff was damaged
unfairly by having its product connected with that of defendant.
In one case, 5 5 defendant made the representation that its dresses
were copies of original "Dior" dresses. Plaintiff claimed that its
product had been falsely represented to be connected with that of
defendant. The court held section 43(a) was not applicable since
148. American Consumers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 416 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
149. Id. at 1213.
150. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963) (cit-
ing with approval Sampson Crane Co. v. Union Natl Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp.
218 (D. Mass. 1949), affid per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950)).
151. See note 100 supra.
152. See notes 138-41 supra.
153. Bernard Food Indus., Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970); Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.T. Timme &
Sons, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
154. See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir
De LIndus. v. Alexander's Dep't Store, 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
155. Societe Comptoir De L'Indus. v. Alexander's Dep't Store, 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1962).
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the representation was apparently truthful, and there was no con-
fusion as to the origin of defendant's garments:
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a commercial rival's truthfully de-
nominating his goods as a copy of a design in the public domain, though
he uses the name of the designer to do so. Indeed it is difficult to see any
other means that might be employed to inform the consuming public of
the true origin of the design.156
A third area in which there is controversy as to whether section
43(a) is applicable, is that in which the defendant fails to disclose
or label its product properly, thereby injuring plaintiff. In Alfred
Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 157 plaintiffs sold damaged to-
bacco to defendants at salvage prices. Defendants, on resale,
failed to label the goods as salvaged and possibly damaged. Since
the boxes bore the trademark of Alfred Dunhill, normally
respected for its high quality products, plaintiff alleged under sec-
tion 43(a) that such a failure to label constituted a false represen-
tation. The district court held for plaintiff stating that "[s] ales of
damaged tobacco in tins bearing trademarks associated with high
quality tobacco, without adequate warnings to customers that the
goods are damaged, involve false representations of their quali-
ty."'5 8 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit reversed on the theory that the section applied only to
actual representations made, and though perhaps a representation
that the goods were damaged should have been made to the public,
section 43(a) was not the appropriate remedy.15 9
A recent case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of
America,160 involved the new Sony Betamax recorder. Plaintiffs
were television and movie producers who claimed that defendant's
advertisement for the recorder failed to advise the public that the
use of the recorder could violate the copyright laws, and thus mis-
led the public into the belief that the use was legal. The court held
that failure to warn the public of the fact that many of the shows
were copyrighted, and perhaps could not be legally copied, did not
state a claim involving a section 43(a) violation. The court based
its decision on the fact that in the absence of any statement, there
was simply not a representation of any sort under the section.161
However, in Bohsei Enterprises Co. v. Porteous Fastener Co.,' 62
the court held that the failure to name the country from which an
imported product originated was a form of unfair competition ac-
156. Id. at 36.
157. 364 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), red, 499 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1974).
158.. 364 F. Supp. at 372.
159. 499 F.2d at 237-38.
160. 429 F. Supp. 407 (CD. Cal. 1977).
161. Id. at 410.
162. 441 F. Supp. 162 (CD. Cal. 1977).
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tionable under section 43(a). In Bohsei, plaintiff, an importer of
industrial fasteners, charged defendants were violating the section
by repackaging their imported fasteners and selling them without
a designation of the country of origin. Although the court recog-
nized that no other court had yet found an omission to be a false
designation of origin, or a false description or representation, it de-
nied the motion to dismiss, holding that such an omission could
constitute a violation under the section.163
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has indicated that section 43(a) is currently being
used in a variety of situations to combat unfair trade practices. It
is in fact, one of the main methods currently available for doing so.
For the trademark and passing off violations, section 43(a) offers
an accessible route to the federal court system, even though plain-
tiff has not had its mark federally registered. Further, in the false
advertising situation, section 43 (a) permits a cause of action when
in fact there was little chance of recovery at common law. The
types of cases currently actionable under section 43(a) should in-
dicate the vast possibilities for future recoveries in the area of un-
fair competition.
Although Judge Clark once stated that "[t]here is indication
here and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized the potential
impact of this statutory provision,"' 64 the many decisions utilizing
section 43(a) in the past several years indicate it is advancing rap-
idly. If the trend continues, section 43(a) will likely be expanded
to allow remedies for other forms of unfair competition. Such fu-
ture expansions should be welcomed for the reason that the sec-
tion aids in promoting honest and fair dealing among commercial
parties, which in turn ultimately benefits the consumer.
Dawn R. Duven '78
163. Id. at 165.
164. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir.
1956) (Clark, J., concurring).
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